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E Unum Pluribus: After Bond v. United States,  
State Law as a Gap Filler to Meet The International 
Obligations of the United States 
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Today, the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence clearly 
establishes that Congress had broad almost unfettered power to make 
treaties, but the concurring opinions in Bond v. United States
1
 may 
foreshadow future limitations on Congress’s ability to implement 
those treaties as part of the domestic law of the United States. Such 
limits would create a vacuum in the power of the federal government 
to prescribe its foreign relations. And open, for the first time, an 
independent space or role for the States in the foreign relations of the 
United States. This new role for the states would be based on 
principles of federalism rather than congressional consent or inaction. 
In the past, this limitation on the constitutional scope of the treaty 
making power may not have been a problem because of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers.
2
  
Historically, foreign policy involved big issues that clearly 
implemented Congress’s “necessary and proper” power “to regulate 
 
 * Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like to thank the participants 
at the Second Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable sponsored by the Franklin 
Pierce Intellectual Property Center at the University of New Hampshire School of Law for their 
insightful comments, and the faculty and students of the University of New Hampshire School 
of Law for their gracious hospitality. I would also like to thank my colleagues for permitting me 
to workshop this Article as a half-baked idea and their kind encouragement. Finally, I would 
like to dedicate this article to my friend Dr. Alan Hidy, who reminded me everything starts with 
just a thick head. As always, the numerous errors are solely those of the author. 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094–2111 (2014). 
 2. Bond v. United States (Bond II), 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2114 (2014). Compare Wickard v. 
Filburn, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), with United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012); see also Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New 
Deal Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 12 (2012). 
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commerce with foreign nations” or represented merely an agreement 
among sovereigns that had little or no impact on domestic law (i.e., 
regulating the behavior of private parties). Since the New Deal era, 
the Commerce Clause was also interpreted as granting Congress 
broad authority to regulate domestic commercial activities.
3
 Recently, 
the Court has been more skeptical of the scope of the Commerce 
Clause.
4
 Balancing the Senate’s power to advise and to consent to 
treaties, and Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to enact 
legislation, the concurring justices in Bond suggest that there are 
foreign policy spaces that Congress cannot regulate and must be left 
to the sovereign states.  
The third player in our constitutional form of federal government, 
the executive branch, may be equally powerless. The courts are 
increasingly skeptical of the executive branch’s role in implementing 
the foreign relations obligations of the United States in the domestic 
arena.
5
 
In the modern foreign relations of the United States, a foreign 
policy space in which the states may unilaterally act is problematic. 
Areas that were traditionally under the general police power of the 
states, such as wills and estates, are increasingly becoming potential 
areas of federal concern as part of a global move to harmonize 
 
 3. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Court’s continued use of that test ‘has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view 
that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.’”) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)). The Commerce Clause has three grants of 
power to Congress to regulate commerce: interstate commerce, commerce with foreign nations, 
and commerce with Indian tribes. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also Naomi Harlin 
Goodno, When the Commerce Clause Goes International: A Proposed Legal Framework for 
the Foreign Commerce Clause, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1196–97 (2013) (Court applies a 
different legal test for Congress’s powers for each type of constitutional grant of power to 
regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause). This Article will narrowly assume that only 
the Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce is implicated in the legal questions 
presented in this Article. 
 4. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578–79; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68 (invalidating the 
Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA)); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608–09; Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 
2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting); see also Misha Tseytlin, As-
Applied Commerce Clause Challenges, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 485 (2013) (analyzing the 
recent cases narrowing the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
 5. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008). 
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markets, promote trade, or protect human rights.
6
 In many nations, 
the ratification of a treaty immediately changes its internal laws so 
that they are congruent with its new international obligations. 
However, in the United States, unless the language of the treaty is 
self-executing, Congress must affirmatively change domestic laws to 
conform to the language of the treaty.
7
 Frequently, because of 
deadlock in Congress or disagreements with the executive branch, it 
is difficult—if not impossible—to get Congress and the President to 
agree on enabling legislation.
8
 
Intellectual property issues are among the most significant and 
hotly contested issues in foreign policy that require treaties that 
regulate private domestic actors.
9
 Therefore, this Article will analyze 
two intellectual property examples, one from Berne Convention and 
the other from the Paris Convention, where state law supplements 
federal law to provide the minimum level of legal protection required 
under each treaty. Part II provides an overview of Bond v. United 
States. Part III will analyze whether the federal law of preemption or 
 
 6. See, e.g., Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, 
Oct. 26, 1973, available at http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/succession; Ku & Yoo, infra 
note 49, at 166. There are many tragically funny examples of the use of foreign trade treaties to 
challenge domestic health and safety regulations, for example Australia’s plain package 
requirements for tobacco products. See Simon Lester, Plain Packaging and Protectionism: 
What is Free Trade?, JURIST (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:00 PM) http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/10/simon-
lester-plain-packaging.php, or the on-going WTO dispute between the US-Mexico regarding 
dolphin safe tuna labeling. Dispute Settlement, United States—Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, DS381 (Jan. 22, 2014), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm. The proposed Trans 
Pacific Partnership might also impose additional limitations on state health and welfare powers. 
See Press Release, Pub. Health Ass’n, Protecting the Health of Australians in the TPPA (Feb. 
18, 2014) http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1402/S00215/protecting-the-health-of-australians-
in-the-tppa.htm (discussing the potential impact in Australia). 
 7. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504–05. 
 8. Cf. Sarah Binder, Polarized We Govern?, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. AT 
BROOKINGS, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/27-polarized-we-
govern-congress-legislative-gridlock-polarized-binder; See Kay King, Congress and National 
Security, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Nov. 2010), http://www.cfr.org/congresses-
parliaments-national-legislatures/congress-national-security/p23359. 
 9. See, e.g., Margot Kaminski, The Origins And Potential Impact Of The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 247 (2009); CCH International 
Encyclopedia of Laws, Cyber Law. 2013 WL 4301545 (C.C.H.); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm Or Wolf In Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011); Wikipedia, Trans Pacific Partnership, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Trans-Pacific_Partnership (Dec. 12, 2014).  
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principles of international law require states to develop their law in a 
manner consistent with US foreign policy. Part IV will discuss public 
policy reasons why a state should, if possible, develop state law in a 
manner consistent with the position of the United States in 
international forums. This Article concludes that if a judicially 
created federalism space in foreign relations is constructed in which 
Congress cannot act to enforce US foreign policy, the de facto motto 
will no longer be e pluribus unum—“out of many, one” from many 
one—but rather e unum pluribus—“out of one, many.” This change 
would defeat the obligation and the intention of the founding fathers 
that the United States will speak in foreign lands with one voice. 
II. BOND V. UNITED STATES 
Through a convoluted series of cases and arguably a strategic 
error or concession by the United States, Carol Ann Bond was able to 
challenge her conviction under a federal law enforcing a chemical 
warfare treaty obligation on the grounds that such enforcement 
breached principles of federalism. Thus, this case clearly presented 
the scope of the treaty making power as opposed to the commerce 
clause power of Congress to enact legislation.  
A. Bond v. United States (Bond I) 
The United States alleged that Carol Ann Bond, a spurned wife, 
violated federal laws prohibiting chemical warfare by placing caustic 
substances (common chemical household cleaners) on surfaces that 
were likely to be touched by her husband’s then-pregnant paramour 
and Bond’s formerly close friend, Myrlinda Haynes.10 Bond entered a 
conditional guilty plea for violating 18 U.S.C. § 229, essentially 
chemical warfare charges, and she reserved the right to challenge 
conviction contending that enacting § 229 was beyond Congress’ 
constitutional powers under the Tenth Amendment.
11
 Section 229 
prohibits knowing possession or use of any chemical that “cause 
 
 10. Bond v. U.S (Bond I), 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) 
 11. Id. at 2360–61. 
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death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
animals” if they are not used for “peaceful purposes.”12  
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit dismissed Bond’s appeal for lack of standing.13 Bond filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari, the United States confessed error, and 
the United States conceded that Bond had standing to raise the 
constitutionality of § 229.
14
 In Bond I, the United States Supreme 
Court in a virtually unanimous decision rejected dicta from 
Tennessee Electric Power Co v. TVA and subsequent case law in 
order to recognize that individuals may challenge federal laws based 
on a claim arising from the Tenth Amendment.
15
 In particular, a 
unanimous Court stated in Bond I that “[w]hether the Tenth 
Amendment is regarded as simply a truism, or whether it has 
independent force of its own, the result here is the same.”16 A litigant 
is “not forbidden to object that her injury results from disregard of the 
federal structure of our Government.”17 Article III of the Constitution 
may require that standing to litigate some injuries caused by 
Congress exceeding its powers as circumscribed by the Tenth 
Amendment, may be limited to a state as a party. However, if there is 
a private injury caused by federal laws that conflict with the powers 
reserved either to the States or to the people for which a federal court 
may provide a remedy, then the injured party has standing to raise the 
issue before the courts. Bond I is significant because it sets a 
jurisprudential stage for private causes of action challenging federal 
laws under the Tenth Amendment.  
B. United States v. Bond (Bond II) 
At first blush, Bond v. United States (Bond II) is an unlikely case 
to change the ambit of the foreign relations powers of the federal 
 
 12. 18 USC § 229 (1998); see also Bond I, 131 S. Ct. at 2360. 
 13. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2361. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 2363, 2366 (where there were seven justices in the majority and two 
concurring). 
 16. Id. at 2367 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The concurring justices 
would have gone further in articulating a jurisprudence allowing individuals to assert defenses 
or challenges based on the constitutional rights of the States. Id. (Ginsburg, J. concurring). 
 17. Id. at 2366–67. 
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government.
18
 However, the three concurring justices contend 
persuasively that the Constitution and principles of federalism require 
a greater deference to the States when Congress implements foreign 
policy in domestic legislation.
19
 The Bond II Court was asked to 
consider “whether the Implementation Act also reaches a purely local 
crime . . . .”20 Bond, an angry wife, tampered with the US mail and 
used commonly available household chemicals to cause a minor 
burned thumb on her estranged husband’s paramour.21 The state 
prosecutors declined to prosecute this rather pedestrian crime.
22 
The 
Office of the United States Attorney took a different view and 
magnified the offense from simple assault and tampering with the US 
mails into the more grandiose and impressive federal charge of 
“possessing and using a chemical weapon in violation of [18 U.S.C. 
§ 229(a)].”23  
Bond II starkly presented the scope of Congress’s domestic law 
making authority under the Treaty Clause because the United States 
waived its argument that 18 U.S.C. §229(a)(1) was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause.24 The Third Circuit 
in affirming Bond’s conviction relied on Missouri v. Holland which 
stated that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute” that implements it “as a necessary and proper 
means to execute the powers of the Government[.]”25 However, 
deftly, a majority of six justices avoided the constitutional question of 
whether Congress exceeded the scope of its power to enforce a treaty 
by limiting the resolution to solely one of statutory interpretation.
26
  
 
 18. Bond II, 134 S. Ct. at 2077.  
 19. Id. at 2094–2102 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 2102–11 (Thomas, J. concurring); Id. 
at 2111 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 20. Id. at 2083. “Local” in this sense indicates non-commercial conduct that is not 
amenable to regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
 21. Id. at 2085, see also Bond I, 131 S. Ct. at 2360. 
 22. Bond II, 134 S. Ct. at 2092–93. 
 23. Id. at 2085–86. Grandiose because the use chemical weapons has arguably been a war 
crime since 1899. Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its Annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land: 29 July 1899, 
art. 23, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949, 187 Consol. 
T.S. 429, entered into force Sept. 4, 1900. 
 24. Bond II, 134 S. Ct. at 2087.  
 25. Id. at 2086 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920)). 
 26. Id. at 2094. Justice Scalia scathingly dismissed this line of authority from Holland 
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Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that Bond’s 
conduct fell within the literal statutory contours of the offense of 
“possession and using a chemical weapon.”27 However, the scope of 
her activities, using common household chemicals that are legally 
available to cause a minor injury that did not require medical 
attention, was more correctly a state law crime.
28
 Despite the clear 
language of the statute, however, the Court presumed under 
principles of federalism that Congress could not have intended to 
displace local police powers over such run of the mill criminal 
offenses without clearly so stating.
29
 The Court held that “[a]bsent a 
clear statement of [‘a serious reallocation of criminal law 
enforcement authority between the Federal Government and the 
States’], we will not presume Congress to have authorized such a 
stark intrusion into traditional state authority.”30 Finding nothing in 
the language of the act or in the legislative history (at least nothing 
the Court cited to) to indicate such a Congressional authorization, the 
Court held for Bond.
31
 Thus narrowly construed, Bond II has little to 
teach us other than to reaffirm a long standing prudential doctrine 
that, in regulatory areas traditionally left to State police powers, any 
Congressional decision to legislate must be done using clear, explicit, 
and unambiguous language.
32
 
However, Bond II’s references to federalism open the door to a 
broader understanding of State power. All of the justices agreed that 
if Congress desires to displace state police powers in areas that have 
been traditionally left to the States, Congress must do so 
unambiguously. The majority alluded to federalism constraints 
without addressing them, while the three concurring justices 
explicitly recognized that principles of federalism may constitute an 
independent constitutional limitation on the US ability to enter 
treaties that affect domestic law. The concurring opinions contended 
that federalism is an independent limitation on the president and 
 
describing it as “[a]n unreasoned and citation-less sentence from our opinion.” Id. at 2098. 
 27. Id. at 2090–91. 
 28. Id. at 2092–93 
 29. Id. at 2083. 
 30. Id. at 2093–94. 
 31. Id, at 2093–94. 
 32. Id. at 2089–90. 
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Congress’s ability to prescribe the domestic effect of foreign relations 
law of the United States. In holding that the federal government was 
so limited, the concurring justices rejected almost two hundred years 
of common wisdom that Congress and the president possessed almost 
unfettered authority over the US foreign relations and the 
corresponding power to translate foreign policy into domestic law.
33
 
The concurring justices agreed with the overall judgment of the 
Court but wrote separately, each contending that the statute was clear 
so that Bond II did not present a question of statutory interpretation 
and judicial presumptions. Rather, the concurring justices argued that 
the Court was required to face the difficult constitutional question of 
the scope of Congress’s power to enact legislation supported by is 
treaty powers. The concurring justices framed the question before the 
Court as whether Congress, pursuant to its powers to make treaties, 
could validly criminalize purely local (i.e., non-commercial) conduct.  
The three concurring justices concluded that the treaty powers 
under the Constitution did not permit the federal government to reach 
purely local conduct in areas that are traditionally occupied by the 
states.
34
 Picturesquely, Justice Scalia quoting Federalist No. 48 wrote 
“The United States Congress—‘every where [sic] extending the 
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex.’”35 The concurring opinions aimed to curtail the constitutional 
sweep of the vortex. However, rather than curtailing the threatened 
vortex, the Court may be setting the constitutional stage for 
unleashing the perfect storm. The concurring justices proposed limits 
on Congress’s domestic constitutional authority in implementing 
foreign initiatives under the Treaty Clause and an increasingly 
narrow reading of the Commerce Clause may create an eye in the 
storm of competing constitutional and foreign policy interests. If 
Bond foreshadows a foreign policy space where Congress cannot act, 
then the states must by necessity of omission or commission become 
foreign policy actors that could further or frustrate a unified federal 
foreign policy agenda. 
 
 33. Id. at 2106–09 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 34. Id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 35. Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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III. STATE LAW AS GAP FILLER 
This Article will examine at three provisions of intellectual 
property law as a model to better understand the difficulties of using 
state law to satisfy federal treaty obligations by pulling examples 
from copyright, trademark, and trade secret law. First, it will analyze 
the protection of moral rights in the United States as an obligation 
under the Berne Convention; second, it will analyze the protection of 
well-known marks and trade secrets as an obligation under either the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris 
Convention”) or the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (“TRIPS Agreement”). There are numerous law 
review articles hotly contesting whether the United States is in 
conformity with its international obligations and whether state law 
acts adequately as a gap filler for missing federal law in these three 
areas. This Article will not foray into this minefield of conflicting 
scholarship. Rather, it merely explores why state law may be 
necessary to fill in the gap of federal law in the context of moral 
rights, the protection of well-known marks, and trade secrets. 
A. Copyright: Moral Rights 
In member states, the Berne Convention protects the moral rights 
of the authors.
36
 Article 6bis provides that, for the life of the author 
plus 50 years, the author retains the right “to claim authorship of the 
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification 
of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which 
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation”; even after the 
transfer of the author’s economic rights.37 Unlike economic rights, 
which are freely alienable, moral rights are inalienable rights under 
the Berne Convention.
38
 
 
 36. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 37. Id. Articles 8, 9, 11, 11bis, 11ter, and 12 of the Berne Convention define the author’s 
economic rights. Id. at 239, 241–43. 
 38. See Aaron D. White, The Copyright Tree: Using German Moral Rights as the Roots 
for Enhanced Authorship Protection in the United States, 9 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 30 (2009–
2010); but see DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01 [hereinafter NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT] (the Berne Convention “merely provides that the author’s previous assignment of 
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As a member of the Berne Convention, the United States is 
required to protect the moral rights of authors of works protected in 
other Berne Convention countries. The Berne Convention is not a 
self-executing treaty.
39
 Congress specifically provided in the 
copyright legislation implementing the Berne Convention that “No 
right or interest in a work eligible for protection under this title may 
be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the 
Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto.”40 
Even beyond its inability to support an independent cause of action, 
the Berne Convention may not be used by courts or arguably state 
legislatures when interpreting copyright laws or in drafting state 
law.
41
 “Any rights in a work eligible for protection under this title 
that derive from this title, other Federal or State statutes, or the 
common law, shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in 
reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the 
adherence of the United States thereto.”42 Arguably, it is not clear if 
this congressional command is a mandatory cannon of interpretation 
to guide the courts or if it also includes the state legislatures. 
 
economic rights does not derogate from subsequent assertion of the attribution and integrity 
rights; but following transfer of moral rights, nothing in the Berne Convention requires that 
those rights must nonetheless rest inalienably with their authors.”). 
 39. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995); 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) 
(2002). 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 104(c). 
 41. Cf. Elizabeth Bulat Turner, The Relevancy of Foreign Law as Persuasive Authority 
and Congress’s Response to Its Use: A Preemptive Attack on the Constitution Restoration Act, 
23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455 (2006) (discussing Congress’s attempts to ban the use of foreign law 
and questioning their constitutionality).  
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 104(c). Independently, the TRIPS Agreement incorporates many of the 
articles of the Berne Convention as separate obligations of WTO member states; however, at 
the strenuous urging of the United States Article 6bis of the Berne Convention was not included 
in TRIPS as an obligation on WTO member states. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 9(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 7 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 23:62. So, there is no effective sanction on a member state for failing 
to comply with the treaty obligations of the Berne Convention thus making the Berne 
Convention a toothless tiger obligation. See, HOWARD B. ABRAMS, ELDRED, GOLAN, AND 
THEIR AFTERMATH, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 491, 510 (2013) (“[the] Berne Convention 
did provide that disputes “between two or more countries of the Union . . . may . . . be brought 
before the International Court of Justice,” but this had no real effect as the Court had no real 
power.”). 
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Whether the United States is in compliance with its obligations 
under 6bis of the Berne Convention is a hotly contested issue. One 
leading treatise author observed: 
The obligation of the United States to provide droit moral and 
the extent to which U.S. law, at the time of our adherence to 
the Berne Convention (1989), already satisfied the minimum 
requirements of Article 6bis were the single most contentious 
issues surrounding adherence. Given the opposition of key 
copyright industries to droit moral, adherence to the Berne 
Convention would not have occurred had the United States 
complied with Article 6. The solution, which had the blessing 
of the Director-General of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), Dr. Arpad Bogsch, was to create a web 
of fictional compliance: the existing combination of federal 
and state laws were deemed to satisfy the minimum Berne 
obligations.
43
 
Another leading commentator concluded, “state or common law is 
more likely to implement Article 6bis of the [Berne] Convention than 
any other feature of Berne . . . .”44 Similarly, all three authors of the 
leading copyright treatises agree that state law is necessary to bring 
the United States into even colorable conformity with its Article 6bis 
obligation to protect moral rights.  
The need for state law to fill the gap left by federal disinterest in 
enforcing Article 6bis has been noted by the federal courts. The 
Seventh Circuit has observed, “Congress initially took the position 
that domestic law already captured the concept in existing copyright 
and common-law doctrines and in the statutory law of some states,”45 
and one district court judge wrote “[i]t is far from clear exactly how 
the language of Article 6bis is achieved under the United States’ 
intellectual property laws.”46  
The need for state action is felt more strongly after the United 
States Supreme Court, in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
 
 43. PATRY, supra note 42, § 16.3. 
 44. 3-8D NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02[B] 
 45. See Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 297 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 46. Brainard v. Vassar, 561 F. Supp. 2d 922, 935 n.7 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). 
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Film Corp., invalidated both the Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 
prohibiting unfair competition—one of the pillars of US protection of 
moral rights—and analogous state law provisions as a “misuse or 
over-extension of trademark and related protections into areas 
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.”47  
If Congress does intend to rely on state law to fill the gap, then it 
is potentially inviting the states to play a perhaps unwelcome role in 
the foreign relations of the United States. The principles of state law 
that create penumbras that protect the moral rights of authors include: 
defamation, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and certain state 
statutes.
48
 Any right that depends on the laws of individual states 
presents the prospect of the United States failing to meet its treaty 
obligation in at least one or more states.
49
 The Constitution and case 
law is clear, however; in matters of foreign policy, the United States 
speaks with one voice, there is only one foreign relations law of the 
United States, and that single law governs all individual states.
50
 
Congress is free to implement its foreign policy obligations 
compelling states to pass treaty compliance laws, by incorporating 
into a treaty specific provisions that recognize that state law will be 
used to meet federal obligations or by ratifying the treaty with 
specific reservations.
51
 However, at least in the intellectual property 
law context, Congress has failed to act. 
 
 47. 539 U.S. 23, 34, 37 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Compare 
Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. 34, 37 with Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (recognizing Lanham Act § 43(a) to create a cause of action for distorting a 
copyrighted work as an actionable misrepresentation). 
 48. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 44, § 8D.02[A]; see also Nimmer, supra note 
38, § 8D.02[D][1] (“Inasmuch as a large part of the moral rights protection canvassed in the 
sections that follow arises out of doctrines of state law, it is relevant to note that in adverting to 
U.S. domestic law, Congress intended to include both statutory and common law, at both the 
federal and state levels.”). 
 49. See JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 160–62 (Michael O’Malley & Kevin 
Pendergast eds., 2012). 
 50. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983); see also 
Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448–49. The concept of one voice has 
recently been subject to severe academic criticism. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby And The 
‘One-Voice’ Myth In U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 975 (2001); see also KU & 
YOO, supra note 49, at 162–68. 
 51. Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of the States and Private International Law Treaties; 
A Model for Accommodating Globalism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1063, 1066, 1066–67 (2008) 
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B. Trademark: Well-Known Marks 
The United States is obligated to protect “well-known marks” 
under either 6bis of the Paris Convention or Article 16(2) of the 
TRIPS Agreement.
52
 However, there is no generally accepted 
definition of what constitutes a well-known mark.
53
 WIPO 
recommends considering the following factors:  
the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the 
relevant sector of the public; the duration, extent and 
geographical area of any use of the mark; the duration, extent 
and geographical area of any promotion of the mark, including 
advertising or publicity and the presentation, at fairs or 
exhibitions, of the goods and/or services to which the mark 
applies; the duration and geographical area of any 
registrations, and/or any applications for registration, of the 
mark, to the extent that they reflect use or recognition of the 
mark; the record of successful enforcement of rights in the 
mark, in particular, the extent to which the mark was 
 
(discussing treating with specific provisions for provincial or state enforcement). 
 52. Andrew Cook, Do As We Say, Not As We Do: A Study Of The Well-Known Marks 
Doctrine In The United States, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 412–13 n.4 (2009) 
(citing Paris Convention 6bis, TRIPS Agreement Art 16, and NAFTA Art. 1708(6)). 
 53. See Well-known Marks, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/marks/well_known_marks.htm. The USPTO uses 
the “likelihood of consumer confusion” test to determine whether a mark is well known. This 
test considers (1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, 
sound, connotation, and commercial impression; (2) the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of 
the goods . . . described in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior 
mark is in use; (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade 
channels; (4) the conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. 
careful, sophisticated purchasing; (5) the fame of the prior mark.; (6) the number and nature of 
similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion; (8) the 
length of time during and the conditions under which there has been concurrent use without 
evidence of actual confusion; (9) the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used; (10) the 
market interface between the applicant and the owner of a prior mark; (11) the extent to which 
applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) the extent of 
potential confusion; and (13) any other established fact probative of the effect of use. See Office 
of Policy and External Affairs: Well-known Marks, THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Feb. 20, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/trademarks/ 
ir_tm_marks.jsp (“There is no separate analysis apart from likelihood of confusion or 
deceptiveness, as to whether a mark is well-known or not.”). 
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recognized as well known by competent authorities; the value 
associated with the mark.
54
 
Well-known marks although undefined by specific language in a 
treaty or statute are a species of intellectual property that is entitled to 
protection under US law.
55
 However, neither the Paris Convention 
nor the TRIPS Agreement is a self-executing treaty, and Congress 
has not amended the Lanham Trademark Act to add express language 
in order to protect well-known trademarks without prior trademark 
use in commerce in the United States.
56
  
Perhaps, Congress believes that it does not have to change the 
Lanham Trademark Act. The United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) has stated its position that unregistered, 
international, well-known marks are protectable under §§ 43(a), 
44(b), and 44(h) of the Lanham Trademark Act.
57
 Section 43(a) can 
be read as a broad protection against the use of an unregistered, 
international, well-known mark in the United States even absent bona 
fide domestic use in US commerce by the global senior mark 
holder.
58
 Section 43(a) does not require that international mark 
holders use the marks in commerce in the United States; it merely 
requires that alleged infringers use the mark in commerce.
59
 
However, existing case law rejects the USPTO’s understanding of the 
Lanham Trademark Act. Courts have uniformly read into § 43(a) a 
requirement that the party claiming to have senior user rights in the 
 
 54. See Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known 
Marks, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/ 
www/freepublications/en/marks/833/pub833.pdf (original formatting omitted). 
 55. See Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 56. See 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 29:61, 29:4 (4th 
ed.). 
 57. Office of Policy and External Affairs: Well-known Marks, THE UNITED STATES 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/trademarks/ 
ir_tm_ marks.jsp; see Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Honoring International Obligations In U.S. 
Trademark Law: How The Lanham Act Protects Well-Known Foreign Marks (And Why The 
Second Circuit Was Wrong), 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1347, 1359–60 (2010); Anne Gilson 
LaLonde, Don’t I Know You From Somewhere? Protection in the United States of Foreign 
Trademarks that Are Well Known But Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1400–03 
(2008).  
 58. Lockridge, supra note 57, at 1358, 1379–91; Lanham Act § 43(a). “Global senior 
mark holder” is defined as the first to use the mark globally. 
 59. LaLonde, supra note 57, at 1398. 
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mark to have actually used it in domestic US commerce.
60
 The 
judicial gloss exists despite a cannon of statutory interpretation that 
“an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”61 
Section 44(h) provides the holders of foreign trademarks 
“effective protection against unfair competition” such that, when 
interpreted in light of §44(b)’s capacious language,  
[a]ny person whose country of origin is a party to any 
convention or treaty relating to trademarks . . . or the 
repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is 
also a party . . . shall be entitled to the benefits of this section 
under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary 
to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty. . . .
62
 
According to this language, § 44(b) provides a statutory basis on 
which to claim that the United States protects well-known marks that 
have not yet been used within the United States—albeit one that the 
US courts have consistently rejected.  
Recently, two US circuit courts of appeals have determined that 
the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement are not self-
executing treaties, and one court read the Lanham Trademark Act 
§ 44 very narrowly to deny federal protection for unregistered, 
international, well-known marks.
63
 The Ninth Circuit in Grupo 
Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallos & Co.—an opinion that was strong on 
cogent policy and devoid of statutory analysis based in the Lanham 
Trademark Act—held that foreign well-known marks were protected 
in the United States by the Lanham Trademark Act.
64
 Three years 
 
 60. Id. at 1399 (for several cases that discuss this judicially-created requirement, see 1399 
n.84). 
 61. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).  
 62. See LaLonde, supra note 47, at 1399–1402; Lanham Act § 44(b), (h). 
 63. See ITC Ltd v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161–64 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 827 (2007). 
 64. See generally Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallos & Co., 891 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 
2004). Just slightly tongue in cheek: it is possible, as individuals in the United States are 
citizens of both the United States and of an individual states, that a foreign government may use 
inconsistent state laws to grant citizens of the United States different rights depending on their 
state citizenship. Cf. CHAD P. BOWN AND JOOST PAUWELYN, THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 75 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010); 
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later, the Second Circuit in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. rejected the 
holding of the Ninth Circuit and invited Congress to amend the 
Lanham Trademark Act to protect foreign well-known marks.
65
 The 
Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve the 
circuit split.
66
  
In both cases, state law played an interesting role as an adjunct to 
§ 44. The Ninth Circuit found that well-known marks are not 
independently protectable under California trademark or unfair 
competition law.
67
 In contrast, the Second Circuit found that New 
York state common law potentially protected well-known marks and 
certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals, which 
answered in the affirmative.
68
 These cases show that foreign holders 
of well-known trademarks may be subject to inconsistent bodies of 
law depending on the circuit or state in which they choose to litigate. 
Furthermore, even within the Second Circuit, the rights of the senior 
foreign well-known trademark holder will depend on the law of the 
states.
69
 This resulting conflict between circuits also frustrates the 
constitutional obligation that the United States speaks with one voice 
on matters relating to foreign relations and the expectations of its 
fellow sovereigns that they will enter into domestically enforceable 
treaties with the United States.
70
   
 
OONA ANNE HATHAWAY AND  HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLITICS 297 (Foundation Press 2005).  
 65. 482 F.3d at 165. 
 66. See Punchgini, Inc., 552 U.S. at 827. 
 67. See Dallos & Co., 391 F.3d at 1100–01. 
 68. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 854, 859 (N.Y. 2007). 
 69. In ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., the federal court sat in diversity jurisdiction regarding 
the protection of an unused, well-known mark under New York state law. See 482 F.3d at 142 
n.3. The court could have as easily applied the law of any other state or determined that New 
York’s choice of law or conflict of laws scheme required the application of the law of a state 
other than New York to the dispute. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 
496–97 (1941). 
 70. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1936); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), NO. 42 (James Madison), NO. 80 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
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C. Unfair Competition: Trade Secret 
The United States has entered into several treaties that obligate it 
to protect trade secrets.
71
 Yet, no civil, federal trade secret law exists 
in the United States.
72
 The United States relies on the laws of 
individual states that protect trade secrets to meet its treaty 
obligations.
73
 The extent of trade secret protection required under the 
Paris Convention and TRIPS is unclear.
74
  
1. Trade Secret (Restatement of Torts) 
Trade secret law is largely an outgrowth of state common law 
protections against misappropriation and unfair business practices.
75
 
Although the majority of states have adopted the Uniform Trade 
Secret Act,
76
 one commercially significant state with a strong 
international trade sector—New York—still relies on the Restatement 
(First) of Torts § 757 as an articulation of state common law.
77
 
 
 71. See, e.g., TRIPS Article 39. The Paris Convention does not affirmatively require its 
members to protect trade secrets. It does however require signatories to protect against unfair 
competition. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis, March 
20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305 (“Paris Convention”). Article 10bis has been interpreted as requiring trade secret 
protection. See Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information Technology in a Culturally 
Diverse Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 137 n. 23 (1996). 
 72. See Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for A Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 427, 442 (1995); JAMES POOLEY, CORP COUNSEL GUIDE TO PROTECTING TRADE 
SECRETS § 10:2 (Nov. 2011). There is however a federal unfair competition act; see, e.g., 
Lanham Act § 43(a), and the International Trade Commission (ITC), can prohibit the 
importation of goods when it finds unfair competition under 19 U.S.C. § 1337. TianRui Group 
Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Whether § 43(a) is 
coextensive with the United States’ obligations under the Paris Convention or other treaties is 
an open question. See ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 161–65; see generally Lockridge, supra note 57. 
However, this article does not endeavor to opine on this question. 
 73. See generally Pace, supra note 72. 
 74. See Christopher G. Blood, Holding Foreign Nations Civilly Accountable For Their 
Economic Espionage Practices, 42 IDEA 227, 234 (2002). 
 75. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 1:8 (4th ed. 2014). 
 76. See infra Part III.C.2 (explaining UTSA). 
 77. See Big Vision Private Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 1 F. Supp. 3d 224, 257 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that a “trade secret is ‘any formula, pattern, device or compilation of 
information which is used in one’s business, and which gives [the owner] an opportunity to 
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.’” (quoting Softel, Inc. v. 
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Consequently, it is worthwhile to discuss whether § 757 of the 
Restatement is fully compliant with TRIPS. 
Under § 757 of the Restatement of Torts, “A trade secret may 
consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information 
which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity 
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use 
it.”
78
 Under the TRIPS Agreement Article 39.2, a trade secret: 
a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the 
precise configuration and assembly of its components, 
generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question; 
b) has commercial value because it is secret; and  
c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the 
circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the 
information, to keep it secret.
79
  
TRIPS Art. 39.2 unlike the §757 of the Restatement, does require that 
the trade secret be used in the owner’s business.
80
 To the degree that 
any state legislature or court requires that a trade secret be used in the 
trade secret holder’s business to receive protection against 
misappropriation, that state is imposing an additional obligation that 
is inconsistent with the minimum obligations of the United States 
under TRIPS article 39.2.
81
   
 
Dragon Med. & Scientific Comms., Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 968 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)). 
 78. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (2014) (emphasis added).  
 79. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(The Uruguay Round), 33 I.L.M. 81 (Dec. 15, 1993), available at http://www.wto.int/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 80. Compare NAFTA art. 1711(1), and TRIPS art. 39.2, with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 757 (2014). 
 81. See Pace, supra note 72, at 453–54.  
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2. Uniform Trade Secret Act 
The Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) has been adopted by 
almost of all the states in the United States, but to call the UTSA 
“uniform” is a misnomer.82 Some states have enacted non-uniform 
versions of the UTSA,
83
 and state courts have interpreted the UTSA 
in a non-uniform matter.
84
 Finally, the federal courts sitting in their 
diversity jurisdiction have added further layers of complexity to trade 
secret law.
85
 The UTSA defines a trade secret as: 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
 (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
86
 and 
 (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
87
 
The USTA § 1 standard appears to be consistent with minimum 
treaty obligations and the right of the United States under TRIPS or 
NAFTA to choose how to implement its treaty obligations through 
domestic legislation. 
 
 82. The major holdout states are New York, North Carolina, and Massachusetts. Trade 
Secrets Act, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
 83. See 3 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW Appendix A2 (Apr. 2014). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See generally David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation In Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (2009–10). 
 86. Several states have deleted “not being readily ascertainable by proper means” from 
their enactments. See Richard F. Dole Jr., The Uniform Trade Secrets Act-Trends And 
Prospects, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 418 (2010) (for example, California, Illinois, and Oregon 
have deleted the “not readily ascertainable by proper means” element).  
 87. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws 1985), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf; 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW 
§ 61:4 (April 2014). “The Uniform Act definition [of a trade secret] is thus considerably 
broader than that of Section 757 of the original Restatement of Torts . . .” JAMES POOLEY, 
TRADE SECRETS, § 2.03[2][A] (2009).  
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The UTSA only imposes liability on third parties when they knew 
or should have known that the trade secret was acquired by an 
improper means,
88
 and at least one state (Iowa) requires that the third 
party have actual knowledge of the misappropriation.
89
 The standard 
for imposing third-party liability under the TRIPS Agreement is 
much lower than that under the UTSA.
90
 Even if one can interpret the 
USTA’s higher mens rea standard as congruent with the TRIPS floor 
for minimum national trade secret protection, at least the law of one 
state is clearly outside the range of permissible interpretations of 
TRIPS requirements. Therefore, even with state law as a gap-filler, it 
is questionable whether the United States meets its international 
obligations to protect trade secrets. 
3. Proposed Civil Federal Trade Secret Protection 
In light of the perceived domestic demand for additional trade 
secret protection for US companies, Congress has considered whether 
to adopt a federal trade secret law on numerous occasions. There does 
not appear to be any attempt to displace or preempt state trade secret 
law by Congress. The proposed Protecting American Trade Secrets 
and Innovation Act of 2012 (PATSIA) was designed to provide 
federal court civil jurisdictions serious trade secret misappropriation 
suits. Generally, these would be trade secret misappropriation cases 
of such magnitude (or international commercial significance) that 
effective litigation would demand nationwide service of process or 
which involved the misappropriation of US trade secrets to a foreign 
country.
91
 Because of the narrow jurisdictional limits in the act, it is 
reasonable to infer that the United States will still have to rely on 
 
 88. The UTSA only protects against third-party use and disclosure if “at the time of 
disclosure or use, [that person] knew or had reason to know that [the] knowledge of the trade 
secret was (I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; 
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain 
its secrecy or limit its use[.]” Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §1 (definition of misappropriation).  
 89. IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2(3) (West 1991); see also 6 MATTHEW G. DORE, IOWA 
PRACTICE SERIES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 38:9 (2013).  
 90. See Pace, supra note 72, at 451–53. 
 91. Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. 
(2012) (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (a)(2)(B)); see also 158 CONG. REC. S5086-101 
(daily ed. July 17, 2012). 
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state trade secret law as a gap filler in the vast majority of trade secret 
misappropriation actions to meet its international obligations. 
Furthermore, even in those trade secret misappropriation cases that 
will fall under the proposed Act, as written, the bill is still 
inconsistent with the international obligations of the United States to 
protect trade secrets.  
PATSIA would incorporate misappropriation either under state 
trade secret law or under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 or 1832 for federal 
misappropriation of trade secrets.
92
 The language of the bill as 
structured, using a disjunctive “or” as a connector, appears to provide 
three separate and independent grounds on which to bring a trade 
secret misappropriation claim. This section will explore the 
possibilities for civil trade secret protection under PATSIA. Though 
the original Act failed, it was slightly modified and reintroduced in 
2014, and it provides a convenient model to understand recent federal 
attempts to civilly protect trade secrets. 
a. State Misappropriation Based Federal Court Jurisdiction 
PATSIA provides that the owner of a trade secret may bring an 
action in federal court under the Act for “a misappropriation of a 
trade secret that is related to or included in a product that is produced 
for or placed in interstate commerce or foreign commerce.”93 This 
Article already discussed the manifold problems of using state trade 
secret law as a basis to provide a uniform level of protection that 
meets US treaty obligations.
94
 PATSIA merely places a thin 
shellacking of federal protection for trade secret rights on top of this 
state law foundation by providing another independent jurisdictional 
basis on which federal courts may adjudicate these disputes.
95
 One 
may speculate that PATSIA as envisioned by its proponents held 
more promise than deliverable reality, if enacted, in providing 
effective federal trade secret protection. Under their diversity 
jurisdiction, federal courts already hear state law-based trade secret 
 
 92. Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012 § 2(a)(1). 
 93. Id. § 2(a)(1)(B). 
 94. See supra Part III.C.1–2.  
 95. See Text of the Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act, GovTrack.us, 
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3389/text 
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misappropriation cases on a regular basis.
96
 And, if the Act is limited 
to “the most serious cases” as claimed by its proponents, then 
PATSIA should be limited to cases that would also meet the amount 
in controversy and other requirements for federal court diversity 
jurisdiction.
97
  
Furthermore, to the degree that the basis of these civil suits rests 
on state law, the proposed Act was not a step forward in achieving 
national uniformity for the protection of trade secrets.
98
 National 
uniformity requires a national law that preempts state laws that are 
inconsistent with the national policies of the United States.
99
 PATSIA 
failed to achieve a national uniform trade secret law, insofar as it 
permitted state law-based trade secret misappropriation and merely 
provided an alternative jurisdictional basis on which the federal 
courts may hear trade secret cases without establishing a national 
floor of substantive protection. 
b. Federal Trade Secret Law (18 USC § 1831 & 18 USC 
§ 1831) 
Federal law criminalizes the theft of trade secrets and the receipt 
of stolen trade secrets. Currently, however, there are no federal civil 
trade secret causes of action. One of the seminal features of criminal 
federal trade secret theft protection is its reliance on state law to 
create and enforce federal interests—and, arguably treaty interests—
in protecting trade secrets. 
 
 96. For example, the search “trade +3 secret /p diversity-jurisdiction” in the Westlaw 
allfeds database resulted in 199 documents. The slightly broader search “trade +3 secret /p 
jurisdiction” in all feds resulted in 2215 documents, roughly one-third of the results of running 
the same query in allstates (8381 documents). 
 97. 158 CONG. REC. S5086-101 (daily ed. July 17, 2012). 
 98. See, e.g., S. 3389, 112th Cong. § 2(d) (2012), expressly incorporating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1838 (1996) (“This chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies, 
whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, 
or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .”); Pace, supra note 72, at 467–68 
(discussing the need for federal preemption of state trade secret laws). 
 99. One tack that Congress could adopt would be to enact trade secret legislation 
following a model based on Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act 
(ESIGN. See 15 U.S.C. 7002(a). ESIGN preempts state law, except in states that adopt a 
uniform version of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). Id. Similarly, Congress 
could craft a federal trade secret law that would only preempt non-uniform state adoptions of 
the Uniform Trade Secret Act. Id.  
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The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) already criminalizes the 
theft of, the attempt to steal, or a conspiracy to steal trade secrets.
100
 
The federal definition of a trade secret parallels the UTSA 
definition.
101
 Section 1831(a) prohibits the knowing theft of trade 
secrets to benefit a foreign government or entity, and § 1832(a) 
prohibits the knowing theft of a trade secret for a product that is 
produced or placed in interstate or foreign commerce and knowing 
that the “offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret.”102  
Unlike state law civil trade secret misappropriation under the 
Restatement § 757 or the UTSA, federal law narrowly defines what 
constitutes criminal misappropriation: misappropriation is committed 
when the defendant “steals, or without authorization appropriates, 
takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception 
obtains a trade secret.”103 So, acts like legally flying over a 
competitor’s construction site to obtain a trade secret would arguably 
not be a criminal act of misappropriating a trade secret. However, in a 
civil trade secret misappropriation case decided according to 
Restatement § 757, E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 
the Fifth Circuit broadly interpreted the Restatement element 
“improper means” in order to prohibit such skullduggery.104 The 
court robustly defined the term “improper means” and, while it 
declined to define improper means in all its possible permutations, 
the Christopher court did hold that the term included “appropriat[ing] 
 
 100. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2013). 
 101. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (1996), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws 1985); see also 
United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting semantic differences 
between the two definitions). Federal courts look to state UTSA cases to interpret the federal 
definition. Chung, 659 F.3d at 825. 
 102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2012). The EEA appears to be severely underutilized by 
prosecutors, if the theft of trade is as widespread as is claimed. Although the EEA is over 
fifteen years old, the author was only able to locate forty cases on Westlaw involving the EEA. 
 103. §§ 1831(a)(1), 1832(a)(1); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 1 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws 1985). 
 104. See E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 
1970). In this case, Christopher flew over a duPont factory and took aerial photographs for an 
unnamed client. All prior Texas cases involving misappropriation of trade secrets included 
either a criminal law violation or a tort as part of the act of misappropriation. Here, the act of 
flying over the unfinished act was arguably legal, as was the taking of the photographs. Id. at 
1014. 
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a trade secret through deviousness under circumstances in which 
countervailing defenses are not reasonably available.”105  
This new commandment of trade secret law could be 
operationalized as an application of United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co.
106
 The Carroll Towing Co. court articulated the formula PL>B 
where B is the cost precautions, L is the amount of loss, and P is the 
probability of loss (L).
107
 The product of P x L must be a greater 
amount than B to create a duty of due care for the defendant.
108
 
Similarly, the court in Christopher held that “[c]ommercial privacy 
must be protected from espionage which could not have been 
reasonably anticipated or prevented.”109 Thus, the court in 
Christopher implicitly balanced the reasonable costs of protecting a 
trade secret against foreseeable disclosure and the value of the trade 
secret, and held “[t]o require DuPont to put a roof over the unfinished 
plant to guard its secret would impose an enormous expense to 
prevent nothing more than a school boy’s trick.”110 
In addition to prohibiting the theft of a trade secret, federal 
criminal trade secret law also prohibits the knowing receipt of a 
misappropriated trade secret.
111
 Under this provision, arguably, the 
Christopher’s are not criminally liable for stealing a trade secret 
(under the EAA) by flying over the factory. The Christopher’s client, 
however, may be liable for receiving a civilly misappropriated trade 
secret.
112
 As the EEA is a criminal act, it provides for no private 
cause of action or remedy for the aggrieved trade secret holder,
113
 and 
of course, the government’s burden for proving such a criminal act is 
 
 105. Id. at 1017. 
 106. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)  
 107. Id. at 173. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1016; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 
925 F2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 110. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1017. 
 111. See § 1831(a)(3) (“receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to 
have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization”); § 1832(a)(3) 
(same).  
 112. Cf. United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2002) (“legal impossibility is 
not a defense to prosecution under § 1832(a)(4) and(5)”); United States v. Case, 656 F. Supp. 
2d 603, 614 (S.D. Miss. 2009). 
 113. 158 CONG. REC. S5086-101 (daily ed. July 17, 2012). 
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“beyond a reasonable doubt.”114 Consequently, the EEA is not 
consistent with either the TRIPS floor for trade secret protection 
because the EEA lacks a private cause of action, narrowly defines 
criminal theft of a trade secret, and requires government prosecution 
to satisfy a high burden of proof. Furthermore, because federal courts 
have to look to state law in applying the EAA, trade secret holders 
again face the real possibility of inconsistency in the substance and 
application of state trade secret law. 
IV. MATERIAL BREACH OF TREATY AND THE LAWS OF 50 STATES 
PLUS 
The United States’ compliance with its treaty obligations could be 
measured substantively or qualitatively. Substantively, the United 
States has breached its treaty obligations when the laws of an 
economically significant state or group of states no longer 
sufficiently protect an interest protected by a treaty to which the 
United States is a member. For instance, if the state laws of 
California, New York, or Texas provide inadequate protection for 
intellectual property rights, then the United States provides 
inadequate protection. Compliance could also be measured 
qualitatively, such that if the United States signed a treaty as a single 
entity, it is required to assure that every portion of its sovereign 
territory is compliant with its international obligations. The United 
States is, at a minimum, composed of fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.
115
 This number is expanded when one considers that the 
United States also administers sixteen territories as insular territories, 
such as American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto 
Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands.
116
 The United States is 
also responsible for the foreign relations of these territories.
117
  
 
 114. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 115. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1675 (9th ed. 2009) (“United 
States of America”). The term “United States” can vary in US law for different purposes. See 
The US Code Defines the term “United States,” FREEDOM SCHOOL, available at 
http://freedom-school.com/code-defines-united-states.pdf. 
 116. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL VOL. 7, HOW TERRITORIES 
AND POSSESSIONS WERE ACQUIRED, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
86756.pdf. 
 117. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/OGC-98-5, U.S. INSULAR AREAS: 
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Through the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution empowers 
Congress to assure that the domestic implementation of the foreign 
relations laws of the United States is national, uniform, and 
comprehensive.
118
 Despite this power, Congress has occasionally 
chosen to allow a patchwork of state laws to substitute for uniform 
national laws.
119
 Generally, intellectual property law treaties leave 
their implementation to the discretion of the domestic law of each 
member state. Member states are free to implement the treaty in any 
manner they choose, as long as their domestic laws provide the 
appropriate level of protection.
120
 
V. PREEMPTION 
The language of some federal intellectual property statutes may be 
sufficiently robust to support a colorable argument that the United 
States is complying with its treaty obligations to protect moral rights, 
unregistered well-known marks, and trade secrets. In reality, the 
actual obligation of the United States is to provide not colorable, but 
rather effective protection through its domestic implementation of 
these treaty obligations.
121
 Effective protection may not be the case; 
however, because federal intellectual property statutes are construed 
and implemented through inconsistent federal or state court decisions 
relying on the common law of individual states. As discussed 
previously, New York State provides a cause of action against 
infringement of well-known marks even absent use in the state, while 
the state of California has no analogous provision. Consequently, no 
state law remedy exists in California, much less an ineffective one.
122
 
 
APPLICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1997), at 3, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/GAOREPORTS-OGC-98-5/content-detail.html. 
 118. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968). 
 119. See Julian G. Ku, The State Of New York Does Exist: How The States Control 
Compliance With International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 476, 502 (2004). 
 120. See TRIPS Agreement, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization art. 1(1), 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
 121. See id. art. 42(1) (“ensure that enforcement procedures . . . are available under 
[national] law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual 
property rights covered by” the TRIPS Agreement).  
 122. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.548. Of course, a party could file an action in federal court and 
request certification of the state law question to the California Supreme Court, or commence an 
action in California state court, and thus permit the state courts to organically develop new 
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California is the ultimate arbiter of whether its law protects 
unregistered, foreign, well-known marks that are not used by the 
mark holder in California. Though individual plaintiffs could bring 
suit to challenge such laws, strategic litigation to develop state 
common laws for effective trademark protection is at best an 
unreasonable burden to place on foreign trademark holder with rights 
guaranteed under international agreement. 
Absent federal legislation, there is a powerful argument that if the 
United States is to conform with its treaty obligations—in the context 
of moral rights, trademark protection, and trade secret protection—
then it must rely on state law provisions to fill the gap between the 
treaty obligations of the United States and positive enactments by 
Congress. This section will analyze federal preemption doctrines and 
their applicability to state law, with a focus on preemption doctrines 
related to the foreign relations of the United States and whether those 
doctrines limit states’ ability to develop state laws inconsistent with 
US foreign policy. 
A. Federal Courts 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 
Congress when acting pursuant to its constitutional authority has the 
power to preempt state law and state laws that conflict with federal 
law are “without effect.”123 Federal courts have recognized two 
general types of federal preemption: express preemption and implied 
preemption. Implied preemption is often broken down further into 
conflict preemption and field preemption.
124
 All federal preemption 
jurisprudence exists against a backdrop that a court reviewing any 
state law must indulge in a strong presumption that state law is not 
preempted and that the preferred interpretation of any purported 
 
common law for the state. Additionally, although extremely rare, state courts applying the law 
of another state may also certify questions of law to those alien jurisdictions. See generally Ira 
P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of Law: A Valuable Process in Need of 
Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 125 (Oct./Nov. 1992); UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW 
ACT § 2. 
 123. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). 
 124. Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass’n, Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. and Bargaining Bd., 467 
U.S. 461, 469 (1984); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995); see Stephen A. 
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 808 (1994). 
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conflict between federal and state law is the interpretation that 
disfavors preemption.
125
 If the interpretation that disfavors 
preemption is the preferred interpretation, then that rule of thumb is 
built on two jurisprudential posits that “‘the purpose of Congress is 
the ultimate touch-stone’ in every pre-emption case”126 and when 
Congress “‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,’ . . . [the court must] ‘start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’”127  
1. Express Preemption 
Express preemption requires that Congress explicitly stated its 
intention to displace all state regulation from an area that Congress is 
constitutionally empowered to regulate.
128
 In the three examples 
discussed in this Article, moral rights, well-known marks, and trade 
secrets, Congress has not expressly expelled states from regulating in 
this area. 
2. Implied Preemption 
In the absence of express congressional preemption, courts may 
find state laws preempted in the case of either (i) conflict preemption 
where the state law conflicts with federal law, or (ii) field preemption 
where Congress intended federal law to occupy the field and displace 
all state regulation.
129
 In either case, state law is preempted if it is 
impossible for third parties to comply with both state and federal law, 
or if the challenged law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objects of Congress.”130 If the 
putative conflict involves an area historically committed to state 
 
 125. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005). 
 126. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. 
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
 127. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 128. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012). 
 129. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
 130. See id. at 372–73. 
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regulation, federal courts will not preempt state law unless “[it] was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress [to preempt state 
regulation].”131 Furthermore, if there is more than one plausible 
interpretation of the statute, then courts should ordinarily prefer the 
interpretation that avoids preemption.
132
  
As there are either ineffectual or no federal laws in the areas of 
moral rights, well-known marks, or trade secrets, the doctrine of 
implied preemption is irrelevant here. 
B. State Statutes and State Courts 
While the focus of scholarly and judicial attention appears to be 
on the federal government’s ability to preempt state laws to assure 
compliance with national policies, a state could arguably embrace a 
doctrine that independently compels it to consider US foreign policy 
when developing its own law. At this time, however, the author has 
been unable to locate any such state-based requirement to defer to 
federal policies. 
VI. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS 
State laws and judicial decisions that are inconsistent with the 
treaties and other laws of the United States are clearly preempted by 
federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
133
 If the 
language of the Lanham Trademark Act and the 1976 Copyright Act 
(including the Berne Convention implementation amendments) were 
pellucid in enforcing federal obligations, there would be no need to 
contend that, absent a change in federal law, the United States must 
rely on state law to meet its international obligations. However, 
foreign policy of the United States is not always established in the 
form of laws and treaties. Lesser acts relating to foreign policy 
positions of the United States include executive agreements between 
the President of the United States and other heads of state or 
 
 131. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Hillsborough Cnty. Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 
471 U.S. 707, 712–13 (1985). 
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internationally recognized juridical entity, or statements made in 
response to questions posed in an international forum. 
A. Treaties 
Treaties are the clearest case of federal foreign policy. Treaties are 
a positive enactment of law under express congressional power 
granted to the president to negotiate and to the Senate to ratify the 
treaty.
134
 In principle, treaties preempt inconsistent state law. 
However, the treaties on which this Article focuses are not self-
executing. In fact, Congress has gone to inordinate lengths to prevent 
the Berne Convention from even inadvertently being considered a 
self-executing treaty.
135
 Consequently, while a ratified treaty is a 
clear expression of federal law, it is does not have domestic effect 
until it is enacted by Congress in a separate act pursuant to one of 
Congress’s enumerated powers. 
B. Executive Agreements 
An executive agreement is “[a]n international agreement entered 
into by the President, without approval by the Senate, and usually 
involving routine diplomatic or military matters.”136 Under federal 
preemption jurisprudence, constitutional executive agreements 
consistently preempt contrary state law. However, the lawful subject 
matter of an executive agreement has received remarkably 
inconsistent treatment over the years. Even absent an express 
preemption clause, a valid executive agreement preempts both state 
statutory and common law.
137
 Consequently, while an executive 
agreement is not law per se, it has sufficient force of law to displace 
 
 134. See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 135. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.12(A) 
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). Almost one-third of the Berne Convention Implementation Act 
(BCIA) of 1988’s sections are designed to “forestall any claim that the Berne Convention is 
self-executing under United States law.” Id. Congress even assured that the BCIA went into 
effect simultaneously with the Berne Convention to prevent any argument that, as a later-
adopted treaty, the Berne Convention modified any aspect of US law. Id. at n.6. 
 136. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
 137. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003); see generally Celeste 
Boeri Pozo, Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine Wanted Dead Or Alive: Reconciling One Hundred 
Years Of Preemption Cases, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 591 (2007). 
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inconsistent state laws. However, there are limits on a president’s 
ability to preempt state laws through executive agreements. The 
executive agreement must comport with federal law and the 
Constitution of the United States.
138
  
In theory, it may be possible for the United States to constrain the 
development of state law through executive agreements that create a 
binding interpretation of a treaty.
139
 For example, in the case of a 
sole-executive agreement, the Court has found that state laws such as 
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA), 
requiring any insurer doing business in California to disclose 
information about those policies to the California Insurance 
Commissioner that interfered with the President’s foreign policy 
powers were preempted.
140
 The President entered executive 
agreements with his European counterparts to encourage them to 
settle Holocaust-era insurance claims.
141
 California chose to adopt an 
approach that relied on regulatory sanctions.
142
 The Court held that 
“HVIRA’s economic compulsion to make public disclosure, of far 
more information about far more policies than ICHEIC rules require, 
employs ‘a different, state system of economic pressure,’ and in 
doing so undercuts the President’s diplomatic discretion and the 
choice he has made exercising it.”143 However, the most recent line of 
 
 138. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530. 
 139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 115 cmt. e (“Since any treaty or other international agreement of the United States, and any 
rule of customary international law, is federal law (§ 111), it supersedes inconsistent State law 
or policy whether adopted earlier or later. Even a non-self-executing agreement of the United 
States, not effective as law until implemented by legislative or executive action, may sometimes 
be held to be federal policy superseding State law or policy. In principle, a United States treaty 
or international agreement may also be held to occupy a field and preempt a subject, and 
supersede State law or policy even though that law or policy is not necessarily in conflict with 
the international agreement, (see § 1, Reporters’ Note 5); the matter has apparently not been 
adjudicated.”) (emphasis added). 
 140. See, American Ins. Assn’ v. Garamedni, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003). American Ins. 
Assn’ at 415 (“At a more specific level, our cases have recognized that the President has 
authority to make “executive agreements” with other countries, requiring no ratification by the 
Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the 
Republic.”). The sources of the President’s constitutional authority to enter into sole executive 
agreements can arguably be found in Art. II, §3 of the U.S. Constitution. See KERMIT HALL, ET 
AL, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 283 (Oxford 2002). 
 141. Garamedni. 539 U.S. at 421–22. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 423–24. 
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Supreme Court precedent suggests that the president’s powers to 
enter into executive agreements or to use the inherent powers of the 
presidency will be subjected the triparte test established in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
144
  
C. Other Presidential Communications 
There also exist other communications between governments that 
are significantly less formal than treaties or executive agreements. In 
Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered the legal effect of a 
statement by then President George W. Bush that implemented an 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in the Case Concerning 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S).
145
 The ICJ held 
that the United States violated the Vienna Convention rights of fifty-
one Mexican nationals when the United States failed to inform the 
Mexicans of their rights to consular services.
146
 As a result, the ICJ 
ruled that the Mexican nationals were entitled to reconsideration of 
their US state court convictions and sentences, regardless of their 
procedural default under state habeas or appellate law by failing to 
previously raise these issues in the state court proceedings.
147
  
President Bush, through a Memorandum to the Attorney General, 
declared that the United States would “discharge its international 
obligations . . . by having state courts give effect to the [ICJ’s Avena] 
decision.”148 Relying on the President’s Memorandum, a prisoner 
petitioned a Texas state court for a writ of habeas corpus.
149
 The 
petition was denied on the grounds that granting the petition would 
constitute an abuse of the writ; because, the prisoner did not raise the 
issue in a timely manner, exactly the procedural default that the 
Avena decision aimed to correct.
150
 The Supreme Court granted the 
petition for a writ of certiorari on the issue of whether the President’s 
 
 144. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 524. 
 145. Id. at 497 (citing Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 
(Mar. 31).  
 146. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. at 60, ¶ 122–23.  
 147. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497–98. 
 148. Id. at 498. 
 149. Id. at 503. 
 150. Id. at 504. 
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Memorandum independently required state courts to reconsider the 
prisoner’s conviction without regard to state default rules.151 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Avena judgment 
constituted an international law obligation of the United States.
152
 
However, the Court found that the Avena judgment was not a 
domestic law obligation of the United States or of the individual 
states.
153
 The Medellin Court then considered whether in cases where 
a treaty creates an obligation for the United States the Constitution 
“implicitly g[a]ve the President the authority to implement that 
treaty-based obligation.”154 The Court rejected this contention and 
found that “[t]he responsibility for transforming an international 
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law 
falls to Congress.”155  
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., the Court first articulated a 
scheme recognizes that the scope of proper constitutional authority of 
the president comes from either an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution.
156
 The president’s power is at its highest when he acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.
157
 It is at 
a moderate level when he acts within a zone where both the 
legislative and executive branches share concurrent constitutional 
power, and “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” 
sustains the president’s authority.158 And presidential authority is at 
its lowest when the President acts against the express or implied will 
of Congress.
159
 In this third situation, the Court can only sustain the 
president’s actions by “disabling the Congress from acting upon the 
subject.”160  
The Medellin Court then analyzed the President’s constitutional 
authority to order state court’s to reconsider a procedural default 
 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 510–11. 
 153. Id. at 511. 
 154. Id. at 525. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952). 
 157. Id. at 637. 
 158. Id. 552 U.S. at 524 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637). 
 159. 343 U.S. at 637–38. 
 160. Id. at 525 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38). 
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using the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. tripartite scheme.
161
 In 
Medellin, the Court recognized that the interest of the United States 
in protecting relations with foreign governments and demonstrating a 
commitment to international law was “plainly compelling.”162 
However, it found, in light of the totality of Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co.’s analytical scheme including “the absence of congressional 
legislation, that the non-self-executing treaties at issue here did not 
‘express[ly] or implied[ly]’ vest the President with the unilateral 
authority to make them self-executing.”163  
In a long unbroken line of cases, the Supreme Court has upheld 
the president’s right to settle the civil claims of American citizens 
against foreign governments or foreign nationals.
164
 The legitimacy 
of this presidential prerogative is based on its age—an almost two 
hundred year tradition to which Congresses has acquiesced.
165
 But, as 
the Court noted, “[p]ast practice does not, by itself create power.”166 
The Court then described President Bush’s exercise of executive 
power as “unprecedented,” and the Solicitor General was unable to 
identify a single instance where the president gave or Congress 
acquiesced to a presidential directive aimed at a state court.
167
 
Therefore because there was no constitutional basis, statutory basis, 
or past practice by the executive branch with congressional 
acquiesce, President Bush’s Memorandum to the Attorney General 
had no legal effect in domestic law.
168
 Consequently, the Court left 
the United States in violation of its treaty obligations, the President 
impotent to act, and Congress—as it often is—silent on a critical 
issue of foreign policy.  
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 537. 
 163. Id. at 527 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635). 
 164. Id. at 531–32. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531–32 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 167. Id. at 532. 
 168. Id. at 532. 
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D. Statements by Government Officials 
In addition to formal written executive agreements, the Executive 
branch sometimes makes statements assuring international partners 
that the United States is in conformity with its treaty obligations 
based on a body of state law.
169
 For example, the United States relied 
on state laws that arguably protected moral rights in order to join the 
Berne Convention. The United States specifically relied on state 
causes of action.
170
 A statement by a the Executive Branch in the 
course of negotiations or in the implementation of a treaty must carry 
less precedential authority in displacing state law than a 
Memorandum signed by the President then it is unlikely that 
positions taken by the United States assuring foreign governments 
that it is incompliance with its international obligations are in anyway 
binding on the individual states or even federal courts interpreting 
state or federal law.
171
  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The concurring justices in Bond v. the United States have 
identified a domestic constitutional (Tenth Amendment) space left to 
the states where Congress (and the President) cannot regulate under 
their constitutional authority (Treaty Clause) over the foreign 
relations laws of the United States.
172
 Also, the more recent precedent 
from the Supreme Court suggests that the scope of Congress’s 
constitutional powers under the Commerce Clause may be reaching 
their post-New Deal nadir.
173
 Accordingly, as foreign relations law 
increasingly impacts the domestic lives of the American people 
which are traditionally regulated by the states, foreign policy spaces 
may appear where Congress cannot regulate under the
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Amendment and where states may have an opportunity to create their 
own laws. Moreover, even in areas where Congress can regulate 
under the Commerce Clause, Congress is increasingly content to 
satisfy its foreign relations obligations by relying on state law. Unless 
preempted by the Constitution or by domestic federal law, states are 
free to develop state domestic law in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the international obligations of the United States. Despite the 
broad freedom that states might enjoy under the Tenth Amendment, 
sound policy dictates that state legislatures and courts carefully 
consider US foreign policy positions as highly persuasive authority 
and only depart from them for compelling reasons. States are 
subordinate in foreign policy to the President and Congress. Under 
our federal system, no one state’s choice of domestic law should 
impact the foreign relations of the United States nor expose the 
citizens of other states to the withdrawal of reciprocal rights or treaty 
benefits by aggrieved treaty-partners.  
* * * 
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